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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY, ; 
a division of Gibbons & Reed, 
a corporation, ] 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ] 
v s . ] 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic, ; 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) No. 19771 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover the cost of concrete materials, with 
interest at the maximum statutory rate and at torney 's fees, on the basis 
of unjust enrichment or pursuant to the provisions of former sections 
14-1-1.1 through 14-1-12 Utah Code Ann. (1953) which require a 
governmental entity that awards a contract for construction of any 
public building, work or improvement and fails to require a payment 
bond, to pay all unpaid persons who have performed labor and/or 
supplied materials for such improvements. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tr ied on a stipulated set of facts with argument on 
the law to the court , the Honorable Scott M. Daniels, Third District 
Judge pres iding, without a ju ry , which re tu rned a judgment in favor of 
plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant (defendant herein) seeks reversal of the 
judgment in favor of plaintiff-respondent (plaintiff herein) and plaintiff 
seeks an award of a t torneys ' fees. Plaintiff fur ther reques t s the court 
to find in its favor on its claim based on unjust enrichment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case in the lower court was presented on facts stipulated to 
by all part ies as set forth in the Pre- t r ia l Order dated November 14, 
1983. (R. at 129-152). Because defendant 's brief fails to adhere to 
those stipulated facts , they are res ta ted here as contained in the 
Pre- t r ia l Order , except where indicated by references to the record. 
Sometime prior to November 16, 1976, a t h i rd -pa r ty , not involved 
in this lawsuit, proposed to develop real proper ty in Salt Lake County 
located at about 3835 South 5780 West. The proposed development was 
to be entitled Larson Estates Phase III . On or about November 16, 
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1976, the owners-developers signed a dedication contained on the 
proposed subdivision plat which stated that all parcels of land shown 
thereon as intended for public use were dedicated to Salt Lake County 
for its perpetual use . A copy of the plat was attached as Exhibit "A" 
to the first Pre-tr ial Order but was not transmitted on appeal. Such 
public proper ty included the proposed s t r ee t s , curb and gut te r and 
sidewalks as shown on the plat , which were to be installed by the 
owners-developers. Salt Lake County would not approve and accept the 
plat for the proposed subdivision, so that is could be recorded, until 
the subdivider had agreed to install , at its own expense, the proposed 
improvements, including sidewalk, curb and gu t t e r . 
On January 19, 1977, the developer entered into a written 
agreement with Salt Lake County wherein he agreed to install such 
improvements and gave the County safeguards insuring that the 
improvements would be made. A copy of that agreement is attached to 
the Pre-tr ial Order as Exhibit "Bft (R. at 138-41.) Defendant did not 
solicit, invite or receive any bids for the work covered by the 
agreement. 
The agreement is a pr inted form which Salt Lake County requires 
all sub dividers to complete and sign before the county will allow a 
subdivision plat to be recorded. This is evident from the fact that the 
printed portion of the agreement refers to Salt Lake County as the 
second par ty and the signature lines at the end of the document contain 
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spaces for execution by the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County and the County Clerk. (Exhibit "B" to the Pre- t r ia l Order , R. 
at 138-41). The agreement with the county requires the subdivider to 
install certain improvements but contains no provision requir ing payment 
for the same. It does not comply with the requirements for a payment 
bond as set forth in Sections 14-1-1.1 through 14-1-12 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). (Conclusions of Law 11 3 , R. at 217) 
On the same date , January 19, 1977, Larsen Estates was presented 
to the Salt Lake County Commission, which approved the plat and 
thereby accepted the lands designated thereon for public use . During 
the first pa r t of May, 1979, plaintiff delivered concrete to Larsen 
Estates for curb and gu t t e r . The curb and gu t te r improvements were 
on land designated for public use within the perimeters of Larsen 
Estates , as accepted and approved by Salt Lake County. Copies of 
plaintiff's shipping statements and billing invoices attached to the 
Pre- tr ia l Order as Exhibits "C" through "Eft, show that the bill for 
such concrete materials was $1637.09. The reasonable value of such 
concrete materials was the same as the amount billed. Defendant, Salt 
Lake County, did not require a payment bond as provided for in 
Sections 14-1-1.1 through 14-1-12 Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
Section 63-30-13 Utah Code Ann. 1953 requires notice of a claim to 
be made upon a policital subdivision prior to commencement of litigation 
as follows: 
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A claim against a policital subdivision . . . is ba r red 
unless notice of claim is filed iwth the governing body of the 
political subdivision within one year after the cause of action 
arises . . . . 
Prior to maintaining this civil action, plaintiff served defendant with a 
demand le t ter . A copy of that let ter with the affidavit of service is 
attached to the Pre- t r ia l Order as Exhibit "F" . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF CURB AND GUTTER IN THE 
LARSEN ESTATES SUBDIVISION WAS ON PROPERTY 
OWNED IN FEE SIMPLE BY SALT LAKE COUNTY AND 
THAT SAID CONSTRUCTION WAS WITHIN THE PURVIEW 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-1-1.1 THROUGH 14-1-12 (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-5 (1953) provides as follows: 
Before any contract for the construction, alteration, or 
repair of any public building or public work or improvement 
of any county . . .or of any officer, board, commission, 
institution or agency of the foregoing, is awarded to any 
person, he shall furnish to . . . such county, . . . or to 
such officer, board, commission, insti tution, or agency 
thereof, bonds which shall become binding upon the award of 
the contract to such person, who is hereinafter designated as 
"contractor": 
(1) A performance bond in an amount to be fixed by 
the contracting body . . . 
(2) A payment bond in an amount to be fixed by the 
contracting body . . . 
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Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-6 (1953) requires the bonding company or 
other person furnishing the bond to pay all unpaid subcontractos who 
have performed labor and/or supplied materials for such public 
improvements, upon proper claims being made therefor , as follows: 
Every claimant who has furnished labor or material in 
the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in 
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this act , 
and who has not been paid in full therefor before the 
expiration of a period of 90 days after the day on which the 
last of the labor was done or performed by him or material 
was furnished or supplied by him for which such claim is 
made, shall have the r ight to sue on such payment bond for 
the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of 
institution of such suit and to prosecute such action to final 
judgment for the sum or sums justly due him and have 
execution thereon . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-7 (1953) requires the governmental enti ty 
to pay the claim of the subcontractor in full if it fails to require a 
payment bond, as follows: 
Any public body subject to this act which shall fail or 
neglect to obtain the delivery of the payment bond as 
required by this act , shall, upon demand, itself promptly 
make payment to all persons who have supplied materials or 
performed labor in the prosecution of the work under the 
contract , and any such creditor shall have a direct r ight of 
action upon his account against such public body in any court 
having jurisdiction in the county in which the contract was to 
be performed and executed which action shall be commenced 
within one year after the furnishings (furnishing) of materials 
or labor. 
Under the s ta tutory scheme set forth above, governmental entities 
that award contracts for improvements upon proper ty which they own 
must require a payment bond from the person to whom such contract is 
awarded to insure that subcontractors providing labor and/or materials 
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for such project are paid in full. If the political subdivision fails to 
require such payment bond, the s tatute is clear that the political entity 
itself must pay the subcontractor . The policy behind this s tatute is to 
assure payment to persons supplying labor and/or materials for public 
improvements. This assurance is necessary as the security provided by 
the mechanic lien s tatute is not available when labor and/or materials 
are provided for a public improvement. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 
(1953). 
In the instant case, the subdivision plat for Larsen Estates was 
submitted to Salt Lake County for its approval and acceptance, so that 
it could be recorded. As a condition for its approval and acceptance, 
the county required the developer to execute a written contract wherein 
he agreed to install 1,712 lineal feet of s t reet surfacing; 2,868 lineal 
feet of high back cu rb ; 2,868 lineal feet of sidewalk; 2 fire hydran t s ; 
one survey monument and 1,231 lineal feet of fence, all on proper ty 
owned by the county in fee simple. The contract specifies that the 
curb and gut ter is to be installed on Cilma Drive and Bills Drive within 
two years and that its installation is to be "under the direction and 
supervision of and in accordance with the specifications of [and to the 
satisfaction of] the County Surveyor" . The contract fur ther provides 
that the County is entitled to specifically enforce its terms and 
conditions. (Paragraph 1 of contract , R. at 138). 
In order to guarantee installation of such improvements, the 
contract requires the developer to deposit $60,824.00 into an escrow 
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account, in lieu of a performance bond, to be used to complete such 
improvements if the developer fails to do so. No provision is made for 
payment of persons supplying labor and /or materials for such 
improvements if the developer failed to pay for the same. 
Upon execution of such agreement and placing the required amount 
of funds into escrow, Salt Lake County approved and accepted the plat , 
and it was recorded. All land shown thereon for public use was 
dedicated and accepted by the County for its perpetual u se . The 
public land dedicated to the county included the curb and gu t t e r , 
s t reets and sidewalks. In accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 57-5-4 
(1953) and Henderson v . Osguthorpe, 657 P.2d 1269 (1962), such 
dedication conveyed fee simple title to such proper ty to Salt Lake 
County. Utah Code Ann. § 57-5-4 (1953), provides that when 
subdivison maps and plats are acknowledged, filed and recorded they 
operate as a dedication of all s t r ee t s , alleys and other public places and 
vest fee title to the same in the county, city or town in which they lie. 
The Henderson case also provides that public proper ty shown on 
subdivision plats is vested in the political subdivision in fee simple. 
There is no question that Salt Lake County owned the real 
proper ty in fee simple upon which the concrete materials wrere used to 
construct curb and gu t t e r . There is also no question that a contract 
was awarded by the County for such improvments. Finally, there is no 
question that Salt Lake County failed to require a payment bond as 
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required by Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-5 (1953) (R. at 132). Because the 
County failed to comply with the s ta tu te , it should pay plaintiff for its 
concrete materials as required by Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-7 (1953). 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that when a contract is 
executed, requir ing construction of improvements to public p roper ty , 
the fact that the governmental entity owning the proper ty is not the 
one who supervises and awards the contract for the public 
improvement, does not discharge the governmental entities1 obligation to 
require a payment bond. Breitling Bros . Construction, I n c . , v . Utah 
Golden Spikers , I n c . , 597 P.2d 869 (1979). In that case, the Utah 
Golden Spikers attempted to lease the Utah State Fair Ground for 
professional soccer games. Negotiations with the state failed to produce 
a written lease. In spite of the fact that no lease was entered into, 
the Utah Golden Spikers had the race t rack at the fair grounds 
removed and a professional soccer field installed. The Utah Golden 
Spikers went out of business and the improvements went unpaid. 
The subcontractor that installed the improvements sued the State 
of Utah for failure to require the payment bond required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 14-1-7 (1953). The opinion did not discuss whether it made any 
difference that the contract was awarded to plaintiff by the Utah Golden 
Spikers as opposed to being awarded by the State, but the court did 
indicate that if a valid lease - the contract in question - had been 
executed, the State would have been required to pay for the 
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improvements. There was no question that the improvements to the 
State Fair Grounds were within the purview of Utah Code Ann . , 
Title 14, Chapter 1 (1953). The fact that the contract was awarded by 
a non-governmental agency was not even a factor considered by the 
cour t . 
The only difference between the Utah Golden Spikers case and the 
instant one, is that the state fair grounds were owned by the State for 
a longer period of time, prior to the improvements beings installed, 
than the curb and gut te r in this case was owned by the County. The 
fair grounds had been owned by the State of Utah for decades. In this 
case, title to the s t ree t , curb and gu t te r and sidewalk areas of Larsen 
Estates was dedicated and accepted by the County in fee simple on 
Jauary 19, 1977 and plaintiff supplied materials for curb and gu t te r in 
May, 1979. In both cases the governmental entity owned fee simple 
title to the p roper ty . It should make no difference that in Utah Golden 
Spikers , the proper ty was owned for a longer time. The instant case 
falls within the purview of Utah Code Ann . , Title 14, Chapter 1, (1953) 
and the county should pay for the concrete materials provided by 
plaintiff. 
The fact situation here should not be dist inguished from tha t 
where the county builds a new courthouse or other governmental 
facility. Salt Lake County "awarded" a contract for installation of curb 
and gut te r in Larsen Estates to the developer. Such contract required 
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certain improvements to be installed in accordance with county 
specifications on real proper ty owned by the county. Defendant should 
not be able to escape liability on the theory that there is a lack of 
privity of contract or that such contract does not fall within the 
purview of Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
Defendant makes several arguments that plaintiff cannot prevail on 
its claim under Utah Code Ann . , Title 14, Chapter 1, (1953) unless it 
shows that the installation of cu rb , gut te r and sidewalks was pursuan t 
to a "public contract" . The s tatutory provisions relied upon by 
plaintiff do not require a "public contract" . Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-5 
(1953) requires a payment bond before a contract for construction "of 
any public building or public work or improvement of . . . any 
county . . . is awarded . . . ." Nothing in this s tatutory language 
requires the improvements to be made pursuan t to a "public contract" . 
The only requirement is that the contract be awarded for construction 
of a public building, public work, or improvement. That the work done 
here constitutes a public improvement is evidenced by the fact that 
courts in other states have held that public improvements under similar 
s ta tues , include the kind of work done by plaintiff in the present case. 
B . Nicoll & Company v . National Surety Co . , I l l Cal. App. 333, 295 P. 
1065 (1931) [paving, grading and laying water pipes under a s t reet 
held to fall within the definition of a public work in the bonding statute 
protecting subcont rac tors ] ; Lane v . State , 14 Ind. App. 573, 43 N.E. 
244 (1896). [Construction of a gravel road qualified as a public work 
within the bonding statute similar to that of the State of Utah ] . 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Contrary to defendant 's position, plaintiff's claim is not ba r red by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act contained in Utah Code Ann . , 
Title 63, Chapter 30 (1953). The Governmental Immunity Act is not 
even applicable. Sections 14-1-1.1 et seq. of the Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) specifically require governmental agencires to pay subcontractors 
who perform labor and/or supply materials for improvements to public 
proper ty if they fail to require a payment bond. The provisions are 
independent of the Governmental Immunity Act and in addition there to . 
Any conflict between the bonding s ta tute and the Governmental 
Immunity Act should be resolved in favor of the bonding provision. 
Where there is a conflict between a specific s ta tute and one of general 
coverage, the courts will look to and follow the s ta tute which 
specifically deals with the problem and will follow the law set forth 
therein. Rammell v . Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977). 
The Governmental Immunity Act was adopted in 1965 - two years 
after the adoption of the Utah Code provisions dealing with contractors ' 
bonds on public improvements. The contractor bond provisions were 
repealed in 1980 and re-enacted in 1983. If the Utah State Legislature 
had wished to nullify the contractor bond provisions, and gran t 
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governments immunity therefrom, it could have done so in 1965 when it 
passed the Governmental Immunity Act; in 1975 when the Governmental 
Immunity Act was amended; in 1983 by not re-enact ing the contractor 
bond provisions; or at any time after 1965. A review of the legislative 
history of these two acts reveals that the Utah State Legislature had 
ample opportunity to grant governmental entities immunity from the 
contrator bond provisions. The fact that it did not do so, shows that 
it intended governmental entities to be liable when they fail to require a 
payment bond from contractors to whom they award contracts for public 
improvements. 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1953) waives governmental 
immunity as to contractual obligations of the State of Utah and its 
political subdivisions. This is a case involving a contractual obligation 
of a political subdivision of the State of Utah. Salt Lake County was 
statutorily obligated to include in its contract with the sub divider a 
provision requir ing a payment bond to insure that all subcontractors 
were paid in full. Having failed to do so, the county then had a 
s tatutory obligation to pay unpaid subcontractors the amounts due and 
owing for labor and/or materials. Inasmuch as the county failed to 
comply with the contractual obligations of the s ta tu te , it should be 
estopped to rely on government immunity to escape liability when 
immunity for contractual obligations is waived. Payment of plaintiffs 
claim would be a contractual obligation but for the county's failure to 
include statutorily required provisions in its contract . 
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Utah Code Ann, § 63-30-3 (1953) provides governmental immunity 
for all governmental entities while engaged in a governmental function. 
The installation of curb and gu t te r is not a governmental function and 
defendant would not be immune from liability under that provision. 
Thomas v . Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (1982). In Thomas, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the installation and maintenance of a sewer 
system was not a governmental function shielding Clearfield City from 
liability when its sewer line backed sewer into a home. Even though 
that case deals with a sewer system and this one deals with curb and 
gu t t e r , the analysis of the court , which relied upon the fact that sewer 
systems are often owned and maintained pr ivately, leads to the 
conclusion that curb and gu t te r and sidewalks are not governmental 
functions that would insulate Salt Lake County from liability. 
Defendant fur ther argues that plaintiff^ claim is ba r red by the 
notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act contained in Utah 
Code Ann. , §§ 63-30-11 and 63-3-13 (1953), because plaintiff failed to 
file proper notice of its claim within one year after the claim arose and 
because notice of its claim was filed after this lawsuit was commenced. 
Defendants argument is in e r ro r . 
As set forth above, plain tiff fs claim is not even subject to the 
Governmental Immunity Act and the notice requirements there in . 
Greenhalgh v . Pason City, 530 P.2d 799 (1975). The installation of 
curb and gu t te r is a propr ie tary as opposed to a governmental 
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function. The Greenhalgh case holds the notice provisions inapplicable 
where a proprietary function is involved. In addition, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-5 (1953) waives liability for claims based upon contractural 
obligations and specifies that the notice provisions of the Governmental 
Immunity Act are inapplicable. This is a contract action to require Salt 
Lake County to pay the price of plaintiffTs concrete because the county 
failed to comply with its statutorily imposed contractual obligations. As 
such, the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act are 
inapplicable. 
In spite of the inapplicability of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
plaintiff filed notice of its claim with the county within one year after 
its claim arose. Plaintiff1 s invoices show that its concrete materials 
were delivered on May 10 and May 11, 1979. (R. at 142-50) A written 
notice dated May 9, 1980, was served upon one of the commissioners for 
Salt Lake County on May 12, 1980 (Exhibit "F,f attached to the 
Pre-Trial Order , R. at 151-52). May 10 and 11, 1980, which would be 
within the one year period, was a Saturday and Sunday. Under Utah 
Code Ann. § 68-3-7 (1953) and Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, if the time in which an act must be accomplished expires on 
a Saturday or Sunday, the time is extended to the following Monday. 
In this case, the following Monday was May 12, 1980, the date notice 
was served. Plaintiff complied with the one year notice requirement. 
I 
Defendant's claim of immunity for plaintiffs failure to file notice 
pr ior to maintaining this action was resolved in the early stages of this 
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case. Plaintiffs original complaint in this case was dismissed 
apparently for failure to give notice prior to maintaining sui t . (R. at 
10-13) This is evidenced from the fact that the order of dismissal 
granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint which he did by filing an 
identical complaint entitled First Amended Complaint. (R. at 16-17) 
The First Amended Complaint withstood a motion to dismiss even though 
it was identical to the original complaint. (R. at 34 and 49) In effect, 
notice was given on May 12, 1980, which was pr ior to plaintiff 
maintaining this suit through its Firs t Amended Complaint filed June 25, 
1980 (R. at 16-17). 
If the court determines that plaintiff did not give notice of its 
claim prior to maintaining this action as required by Utah Code Ann . , 
§ 63-30-11 (1953), any dismissal should be other than on the merits 
with plaintiff given the opportunity to give notice and maintian its suit 
in proper order within one year after dismissal. Yates v . Vernal 
Family Health Center , 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980). In Yates, the Utah 
Supreme Court in terpre ted the notice provisions of the medical 
malpractice act contained in Utah Code Ann . , § 78-14-8 (1953), which 
require a plaintiff to give notice before a "malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be commenced . . ., f r as prescr ib ing a 
condition precedent for filing an action. The court held that failure to 
comply with that requirement would resul t in a dismissal other than on 
the merits giving plaintiff one year in which to br ing its action under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953) . In this case, Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 63-30-11 requires that notice be given before a lawsuit is 
"maintained". A dismissal for failure to comply with such requirement 
would be other than on the meri ts , allowing plaintiff one year in which 
to file its complaint. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS PRECLUDED FROM RELIEF UNDER THE MECHANIC 
LIEN PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CODE. 
The lower court correctly held that plain tiff !s concrete was used 
for a public improvement as the same was installed at the County's 
insistence on land owned in fee simple by the County. (R. at 199). 
The lower court was also correct in holding that plaintiff could not have 
liened such public improvements as the same is prohibited by the 
mechanic lien provisions contained in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 (1953), 
as follows: 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any 
public building, s t ruc ture or improvement. 
Defendant incorrectly argues that plaintiff could have filed a valid 
mechanic lien on the individual lots within Larsen Estates Phase III . 
Appel lants Brief at 20-21. Defendant fails to point out that the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1953) grant a lien only on Mthe 
proper ty upon or concerning which they have rendered service, 
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performed labor or furnished materials . . . ." In this case, plain tiff Ts 
materials were provided for work done on proper ty owned in fee simple 
by the County. Plaintiff could not have filed a hen on proper ty owned 
by the individual lot owners or the developer because plaint iffs 
materials were not used for work which was done thereon. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRORED BY FAILING TO 
FIND IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOR ON THE 
BASIS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Where one performs services or supplies materials to another with 
the knowledge and approval of the recipient and the recipient retains 
the same under circumstances making retention inequitable without 
payment therefore, the law imposes on the recipient the obligation to 
pay the fair value of the services or materials bestowed. 12 Willis ton 
on Contracts , § 1479 at 276; Breitling Bros . Construction, Inc. v . Utah 
Golden Spikers , I n c . , 597 P.2d 869 (Utah 1979); 66 Am. J u r . 2d . , 
Restitution and implied Contracts , §§ 24 and 28. In Breitling B r o s . , 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that recovery on the basis of unjust 
enrichment may be appropriate where the s ta te , without contracting for 
such improvements, had received the benefit of having a soccer field 
installed at the state fairgrounds where a race t rack had been. After 
making such holding, the court remanded for a new trial because the 
lower court had refused to allow evidence as to the benefit to the State 
of such installation. 
The facts in Brietling are similar to the facts of this case and 
recovery on the basis of unjust enrichment is appropriate . Plaintiff 
supplied concrete materials for improvements on defendants p roper ty . 
The improvements were required by defendant and installed with its full 
knowledge and approval. The improvements increased the value of 
Larsen Estates , result ing in an increased tax base for the county. 
Defendant should not be allowed to escape liability by arguing no 
benefit to itself. Equity demands payment to prevent the county from 
being unjustly enriched at plaintiffTs expense. The measure of the 
unjust enrichment is the reasonable value of the concrete materials or 
$1,637.09, with interest thereon at the s tatutory ra te . Peavey v . 
Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 551 P.2d 610 (1976); 66 Am. J u r . 2d, 
Restitution and Implied Contracts § 28 et . seq. 
Defendant argues that plaintiffTs claim based on unjust enrichment 
is bar red because plaintiff did not file notice with the county as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 (1953). As set forth 
above, the installation of curb and gut te r constitutes a proprietary as 
opposed to a governmental function and the Governmental Immunity Act, 
including the notice provisions, are inapplicable. If such provisions 
were applicable plaintiff gave the County proper notice of its claim. 
The Governmental Immunity Act does not specify that a claimant's legal 
theories be set forth in the notice. All that is required is that the 
governmental entity be made aware that a claim is being asserted and 
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the factual basis for such claim. PlaintiffTs demand let ter satisfies the 
requirements for a notice of claim as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-13 (1953). (R. at 151-52). 
Defendant fur ther argues that plaintiff1 s claim for unjust 
enrichment is ba r red by the one year s ta tute of limitations contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1953). Plaintiff's cliam is not ba r r ed . 
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides 
that claims or defenses asser ted in amended pleadings which arise out 
of the same set of facts or transactions as the original pleading relate 
back to the date of the original pleading, tolling the s ta tute of 
limitations as follows: 
Whenever the claim or defense asser ted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, t ransact ion, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in. the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the 
original pleading. 
This provision is identical to that contained in Rule 15(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In Commenting upon that provision, Moore's 
Federal Practice states as follows: 
The Federal Rules have broadened the meaning of the 
concept of ncause of act ion/1 shifting the emphasis from a 
theory of law as to the cause of action, to the specified 
conduct of the defendant upon which plaintiff relies to 
enforce his claim. And an amendment which changes only the 
legal theory of the action, or adds another claim arising out 
of the same transaction or occurrence, will relate back. 
Thus , an amendment will relate back which changes the 
theory of recover as to the type of negligence claimed, or 
adds additional grounds of negligence, changes the theory of 
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the action from one based on contract to one sounding in 
tort, changes a demand for equitable relief to one for legal 
relief, states a different fulfillment of conditions precendent , 
or increases the amount of damages claimed. (emphasis 
added) . 3 MooreTs Fed. Practice 1T 15.15(3) at 15-198. 
Plain tiff Ts claim for unjust enrichment, is not bar red by the 
applicable statute of limitation because it arises out of the same 
transaction and set of facts as the original complaint filed in this 
matter . Peterson v . Union Pac. R. R. Co. , 8 P.2d 627 (Utah 1932); 
See also, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v . Clegg, 135 P.2d 919 
(Utah 1943). Both claims allege that plaintiff is entitled to recover 
from the defendant because concrete materials were supplied for curb 
and gut te r improvements on real proper ty owned by Salt Lake County. 
The amended complaint merely clarifies plain t i f fs legal reasoning and to 
the extent that it does so adds a legal theory upon which relief may be 
granted . Inasmuch as the amended complaint relates back to the date 
of the original complaint, the s tatute of limitations does not bar 
plaintiff1 s claim. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ERRORED BY FAILING TO 
ALLOW PLAINTIFF ITS ATTORNEYS1 FEES 
The Pre-tr ia l Order entered by the lower court specified one of 
the issues of law for the trial to be plaintiffTs entitlement to a t torneys ' 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-8 (1953). (R. at 135). Point V of 
Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum stated the s ta tutory basis for plaintiff's 
- 22 -
claim for at torneys fees. (R. at 126) Counsel for plaintiff reminded 
the court during oral argument at the trial that it was seeking 
reimbursement for attorneys1 fees. ( T r . at 254-55) In spite of the 
fact that the issue of at torneys1 fees was clearly before the cour t , the 
court ' s Memorandum Decision fails to even mention at torney 's fees. 
Plaintiffs are clearly entitled to at torneys1 fees, should they 
prevail , under Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-8 (1953) as follows: 
In any action brought upon either of the bonds provided 
herein, or against the public body failing to obtain the 
delivery of the payment bond, the prevailing; pa r ty , upon 
each separate cause of action, shall recover an a t torney 's fee 
to be taxed as costs . 
There is no question under this s ta tutory provision that if plaintiff 
prevails in this action, it is entitled to recover a reasonable a t torneys ' 
fee and the court should award plaintiff the same if it finds in its 
favor. 
On the cont rary , if defendant prevai ls , it is not entitled to 
at torney 's fees. A ruling in defendant 's favor will necessarily resul t in 
a finding that Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-1 et . seq. (1953) is inapplicable 
to this case. If the court makes such finding it would be contradictory 
for the court to then hold that Section 14-1-8 applies and that the 
defendants are entitled to a t torney 's fees. The defendant cannot have 
it both ways. Either the above code sections apply or they do not 
apply. If they apply plaintiff will prevail and it should receive an 
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award of at torney's fees. If they do not apply, defendant will prevail 
and it cannot rely upon those sections to receive an award of at torney's 
fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests the court 
to determine that the improvements herein are within the purview of 
Chapter 14, Title 1 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953) and that in 
accordance with §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-8, or on the basis of unjust 
enrichment, plaintiff is entitled to recover $1,637.09 from defendant 
with interest thereon, its costs , and a reasonable a t torneys ' fee. 
DATED this day of May, 1984. 
„ thJULP.. 
Bryce E. Roe 
Valden P. Livingston 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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